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Abstract 
Using panel data for twenty-seven post-communist economies between 1987-2003, we examine 
the nexus of relationships between inequality, fiscal capacity (defined as the ability to raise 
taxes efficiently) and the political regime. Investigating the impact of political reform we find 
that full political freedom is associated with lower levels of income inequality. Under more 
oligarchic (authoritarian) regimes, the level of inequality is conditioned by the state’s fiscal 
capacity. Specifically, oligarchic regimes with more developed fiscal systems are able to defend 
the prevailing vested interests at a lower cost in terms of social injustice. This empirical finding 
is consistent with the model developed by Acemoglu (2006). We also find that transition 
countries undertaking early macroeconomic stabilisation now enjoy lower levels of inequality; 
we confirm that education fosters equality and the suggestion of Commander et al (1999) that 
larger countries are prone to higher levels of inequality. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
During the last two decades a new and important literature addressing the complex relationship 
between economic performance, political regime and income inequality has emerged. This 
strand of recent research speaks to problems concerning the ‘first generation’ models of 
inequality, dating back to Kuznets (1955)
1. In particular, recognising the political system as the 
conduit through which demands for redistribution are channelled and delivered, attention has 
turned to examining the way in which political and economic factors shape the income 
distribution. Yet, many questions remain unanswered and the quest to unearth causal 
relationships, develop appropriate empirical tools and ultimately to inform economic policy 
remains paramount.   
 
The diversity of experience across time and space draws attention to some of the underlying 
complexities. While in the democracies of the United States and parts of Western Europe, 
inequality has advanced contemporaneously to economic growth, in the former Communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the paths of inequality, economic 
liberalisation and political reform have varied considerably. In turn, the so-called ‘Asian Tigers’ 
have achieved economic growth alongside relatively stable income distributions under both 
more and less autocratic regimes. These examples all speak to the need for further research into 
the co-evolution of economic policies, political structure and inequality. The task of this paper 
is to subject these relationships to a detailed empirical examination in the unique ‘experimental’ 
context conferred by the ‘transition’ countries emerging from the Soviet block since 1989
2. 
 
The exceptional scale and pace of this unique historical ‘experiment’ stem from the distinct 
features of these countries at the onset of ‘transition’ - semi-autarchic command economy 
systems remote from the co-ordinating mechanism of the market. From the late 1980s the 
transition economies have encountered the introduction of economic and political reform as the 
region has both globalised and democratised to varying degrees. In aggregate, during this 
period, the region has experienced rising inequality, a J-curve of economic growth and a 
progressive increase in both ‘democracy’ and economic reform (see Figure 1 below). These 
                                                 
1 See for example Barro (2000) and Forbes (2000) among others. 
2 Following the established tradition, we also include here the former republics of Yugoslavia, and Albania. That 
produces the set of twenty-seven countries labelled by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) as ‘transition economies’ (see: EBRD 1994-2005, and for recent discussion - Mickiewicz, 2005).   2
parallel processes allow us to address recent developments in the literature that bestow greater 
emphasis on issues pertaining to the political framework and to economic institutions
3.   
 
In this paper, we match a rigorously selected panel of compatible income inequality figures, 
drawn from the UN WIID2a dataset, with the Freedom House indicators of political rights and 
civil liberties, with macroeconomic indicators from the World Bank and with human capital 
indicators derived from the TransMonee database. The nature of the data prevents us from 
applying panel methods based on first-differencing. Accordingly, we investigate income 
inequality through the application of ‘effects models’, with our choice of estimators based on 
appropriate specification tests. This approach allows us to go some way towards articulating the 
tangled relationship between economic reform, political reorganisation and income inequality in 
the context of post-communist transition. 
 
We find that full political freedom is associated with lower levels of income inequality. Under 
more authoritarian regimes, the level of inequality is conditioned by the state’s fiscal capacity. 
Specifically, oligarchic regimes with more developed fiscal systems are able to defend the 
prevailing vested interests at a lower cost in terms of social injustice. This empirical finding is 
consistent with the model developed by Acemoglu (2006) and offers some important lessons for 
policy makers in reforming countries. Additionally, we find that transition countries 
undertaking early programmes of macroeconomic stabilisation now enjoy lower levels of 
inequality; we confirm that education fosters equality and the proposition of Commander et al 
(1999) that larger countries are prone to higher levels of inequality. Finally, we speculate that 
countries experiencing a longer period under the communist regime are now less able to utilise 
fiscal tools to effectively raise revenue. We interpret this in the context of the recent work by 
Persson and Tabellini (2006), which stresses the importance of the ‘stock of democratic 
capital’. Those countries with a deeper and longer experience of communism have emerged 
with a lower stock of democratic capital. 
 
We proceed as follows. In section 2, through surveying the relevant literature, we highlight 
some theories at the forefront of political economy approaches to the study of inequality and 
consider how these relate specifically to the transition countries. In section 3, we discuss our 
data, paying special attention to methodological nuances concerning the measurement of 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Kapstein and Milanovic, 2003; Mickiewicz, 2005; Havrylyshyn, 2006.   3
inequality and institutions. We then explain our specifications and consider some of the 
econometric issues associated with our estimations. In section 4, we present our results before 
forwarding cautious conclusions in section 5.  
 
2.  Motivation and Literature Review 
 
2.1 The Political Economy of Inequality and Liberalisation 
 
The modelling of inequality has evolved considerably in recent years, though the point of 
departure for much analysis remains the somewhat mechanistic approach, reflected in the 
“Kuznets hypothesis” (Kuznets, 1955, 1963; see also the discussion in Aghion et al., 1999). The 
Kuznets approach associates the initial stage of industrialisation with high levels of inequality 
observed as the gap between the unskilled (old, agricultural) sector and the skilled (new) sector 
of the economy reaches a peak. Subsequently, as the economy develops, the distribution 
contracts. That is, as the sectoral structure of employment proceeds from the dominance of 
agriculture through the industrial phase towards eventual convergence on a service sector 
structure, the income distribution maps out an inverted U-shaped curve
4. This is deterministic in 
so far as income differentials emerge over time in response to the shifting structure of 
production. 
 
Yet this interpretation has a number of drawbacks. First, it cannot explain the global surge in 
inequality experienced in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Second, though not unrelated, this version of 
events says nothing of the diversity of economic processes and institutions evolving over time
5. 
In particular, the recent literature witnesses a shift from the quest for unearthing uniform 
patterns of development to the increased recognition of the role played by political institutions 
and economic policies. Third, even if one can establish a correlation between economic 
development and inequality, both phenomena themselves may be driven by some other factor. 
If this is the case, it is an empirical challenge to isolate distinct causal effects. 
                                                 
4 A related version of this story identifies the role of a narrow class of capitalists at the first phase of the 
industrialisation process, with a high propensity to save and invest. The resultant inequality emerging during this 
early stage is seen as a necessary price for economic growth. Kuznets (1963) hints at this interpretation when 
pointing out that “a smaller proportion of the population amasses savings consistently” in developing countries 
(ibid., p.48). 
5 Kuznets (1963) chose to emphasise the role of technology and the structure of production though was fully aware 
of the interplay between the technological and institutional factors, and between income and wealth distribution 
and political power relations.   4
The ‘new’ strand of literature departs from the traditional approach in several respects. The 
customary emphasis placed on the role of concentrated savings in fuelling investment and 
growth is recast in the context of its dependence on both the level of financial sector 
development and the willingness of economic actors to invest. The efficient transmission from 
savings to investment is conditional on key capital market characteristics, such as the stability 
of property rights. Where little legal protection is offered, investment capacity will tend to 
remain concentrated in the hands of the richest and most influential at the expense of 
entrepreneurs with potentially more profitable investment projects (Glaeser et al., 2003). 
 
New themes emerging in the globalisation – inequality realm highlight the impact of skill-
biased technological change (Katz and Murphy, 2002), evolving terms of trade, and factors 
affecting labour supply. Empirical evidence on the effects of liberalisation in developing 
countries is very mixed. It is now generally accepted that the potential impact of external 
openness on inequality is smaller than expected and may be counterbalanced by policy driven 
elements, such as education (Anderson, 2005a; Lundberg and Squire, 2003; Atkinson, 2000). If 
economic theories of globalisation are able to identify the potential effects of liberalisation and 
changing terms of trade then, implicitly or otherwise, they are identifying processes which 
create ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ and hence impact the income distribution. Likewise, if an income 
distribution containing ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ is an outcome of economic policies, processes and 
institutions, then those in turn must result from interaction with the prevailing political edifice. 
Milanovic and Kapstein (2003) provide evidence that the inequality augmenting effect of 
reforms is less pronounced in high-income countries. It may therefore be that the degree of 
inequality is conditioned more by the deficiencies of the democratic decision making process 
than by the level of economic development per se. A natural extension of Milanovic and 
Kapstein’s (2003) findings may therefore be to shift attention from the level of income to the 
quality of the democratic process as the key characteristic defining the orbit of economic 
policies adopted. 
The early empirical work linking democracy to inequality was typically inconclusive. Sirowy 
and Inkeles (1991), surveying the then published work up, found limited evidence that 
democracy lowers inequality. More recent studies, recapped in Gradstein and Milanovic (2004), 
find democracy to benefit those in the bottom quintile of the distribution. Yet any consensus on 
the ambiguity of the causal link necessarily overlooks that, while the direct association between 
democracy and inequality may be weak, there remains the possibility that democracy affects 
inequality indirectly through its impact on economic institutions and economic policies. In   5
short, it is clear that the link between economic variables, political institutions and the income 
distribution is close but complicated and that the dominant direction of influence is ambiguous. 
Whatever form these tangled relationships assume, political institutions mark out the decisive 
channel through which the demand and supply of redistributive policy is provided for. These 
institutions in turn are the product of a complex mix of contemporary and historical political 
decision-making. Characterised by their semi-autarchic initial conditions, rapid economic 
reform and introduction of democratic structures, the transition economy setting provides a 
convenient testing ground in which to explore many of these arguments. 
 
2.2. The Political Economy of Inequality and of Political and Economic Transition  
 
Aghion and Commander (1999) present a dynamic general equilibrium model examining the 
impact of various economic policy choices on inequality in transition economies. The model 
illustrates the shift from the rigid wage grids of the state sector (characterised by insider rent 
appropriation) to a private sector in which wages reflect the marginal product of labour. The 
important feature of the model is the distinction drawn between the short-term and long-term 
(equilibrium) effects of reforms on inequality. In particular, faster restructuring, privatisation 
methods focused on outsiders, greater fiscal equality between the state and private sectors and 
more generous unemployment benefits (pro-poor redistribution) are associated with both 
steeper initial increases in inequality but also with lower long-term (equilibrium) inequality. For 
our purposes, two important implications fall out of this model. First, rapid liberalisation 
produces an initial surge in inequality before the distribution equilibrates at a lower long-run 
level. Second, in so far as the maintenance of soft budget constraints is associated with deficit-
based or inflationary finance, and is eliminated by macroeconomic stabilisation, early 
stabilisation reaps similar outcomes to early liberalisation. 
 
A further important filter affecting the final distribution of incomes is freedom of entry and the 
evolution of the de novo sector. A reinterpretation of ‘new sector’ hiring in the Aghion and 
Commander (1999) model could illustrate this. Instead of capturing the balance of labour 
market states (i.e. unemployment/vacancy ratios), hiring into the ‘new sector’ may plausibly 
become a policy parameter itself. Indeed, this is consistent with the recent emphasis placed on 
the role of new entries in transition in which freedom of entry, resulting in the rapid expansion 
of new firm employment, is now seen as a major driver of economic performance (Jackson et 
al., 2005). Examining two very different transition countries, Poland and Russia, Berkowitz and   6
Jackson (2006) find a significant positive relationship between the development of the de novo 
sector and the income share of the lower end of the income distribution. Re-interpreting the 
hiring rate as a proxy for new private firm creation, itself directly affected by entry barriers, the 
short-term impact of liberalisation on income equality is no longer unambiguously negative. 
That is, while liberalisation-induced restructuring may exacerbate levels of inequality, 
facilitating entrepreneurship and promoting the freedom of entry of new firms may attenuate it. 
To see the latter relationship more clearly, we refer to the new literature on the link between 
political and economic institutions, policy making and the income distribution. In this respect, 
the model of Acemoglu (2006) presents a political system in which an oligarchic class acts to 
defend their privileged share in the income distribution from both the middle class 
(entrepreneurs) and the working class. Two possible economic policies emerge, contingent on 
the institutional framework. The first (a more efficient route to income redistribution) involves 
manipulating the fiscal system to produce a combination of taxes and subsidies such that 
sufficient relative gains for the oligarchs are generated while still leaving the entrepreneurial 
class with the incentives to produce. However, where the fiscal system is underdeveloped, the 
best available option is to hamper entrepreneurial activity through explicit entry barriers and so 
achieve the desired income distribution via factor price manipulation. In particular, by 
restricting entry for new entrepreneurs and depressing aggregate output and labour demand, the 
wages of workers are driven down, furnishing the incumbent oligarchic producers with relative 
advantages. Greater inequality pertains in the second case
6. 
 
We believe that this line of argument conveys material significance for our understanding of the 
transition process. Most of the transition countries, which did not fully liberalise evolved into 
autocratic oligarchic systems in which entry barriers could lead to more unequal income 
                                                 
 
6 In addition, given the low wages (resulting from the insufficient number of active entrepreneurs), workers may 
not face incentives to invest in human capital. This, in turn, propagates ‘bad equilibria’ characterised by low 
education and low wages (see Dias and McDermott, 2006). One can link Acemoglu (2006) with an earlier seminal 
paper on regulation of entry by Djankov et al. (2002). In the latter, oligarchs pursue less efficient policies (via 
entry barriers) to protect their interests instead of efficient policies (through incentives in the fiscal system which 
allow for the entrepreneurial sector to grow, in order to tax it later) because their time horizon is shorter (see also: 
De Long and Shleifer, 1993). In contrast, according to Acemoglu (2006) the policy choice is conditional on the 
overall quality of the fiscal system (i.e. on the deadweight cost of fiscal redistribution), where the latter is seen as 
exogenous with respect to the contemporaneous policy choice taken by oligarchs. For our purposes, we refer to 
Section 3 of the Acemoglu (2006) paper. The model is general enough to allow for different interpretations of 
restricted entry. In particular, it is consistent with an interpretation emphasising the weak protection of property 
rights, inadequate judiciary systems and corruption, in which only the rich and influential have resources to protect 
themselves and small entrepreneurs are discouraged from entry and investment. This results in “King John’s” 
redistribution of income rather than “Robin Hood’s redistribution” (see Glaeser et al. (2003), Sonin (2003) and 
Hellman and Kaufmann (2003)).    7
distributions via the type of factor price manipulation described above. Russia provides just 
such a case (see for example, McKinsey 1999; Barkhatova, 2000; Aidis and Adachi, 2006; 
Estrin and Prevezer, 2006). The symbiosis between the incumbent, heavily concentrated 
business groups, the public administration and the financial sector renders the entry of 
independent producers problematic. Additionally, and in accordance with the Acemoglu (2006) 
model, regional government officials argue explicitly that the entry of strong foreign investors 
may hurt their local economies (read: incumbent businesses) by increasing wage levels
7. 
Moreover, there are obstacles to local level entry in the form of incrementally more hostile tax 
and bureaucratic environments
8. On the other hand, in countries that fully liberalised, 
entrepreneurship offered an important route away from the lower end of the income distribution 
(Berkovitz and Jackson, 2006; Keane and Prasad, 2006). This comparative line of reasoning 
concurs with the policy-oriented labour market diagnosis of the transition economies, which 
stresses the negative impact of entry barriers on the labour market (Rutkowski et al., 2005). On 
another plane, it remains compatible with the conclusions of Djankov et al. (2002) that barriers 
to entry are strongly associated with autocracy. 
 
The Acemoglu (2006) model also serves to underscore the importance of the government’s 
fiscal capacity. While, it is true that “the weakness of fiscal policy makes it difficult for 
governments to redistribute public benefits to those at the bottom of the income distribution.” 
(Kapstein and Milanovic, 2003, p.1; see also Aghion and Commander, 1999)
9, a different effect 
may operate in the case of oligarchic systems. Specifically, without fiscal instruments, the 
privileged class may seek to protect its interests through more crude policy measures such as 
entry barriers. These measures not only depress output but also widen income gaps via the 
labour market. Accordingly, the public finance environment may have critical implications for 
the distribution of income. 
  
With respect to the latter, there are marked differences between the transition countries. The 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) experienced a dramatic implosion of tax collection 
relative to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Schaffer and Turley (2001) 
demonstrate that the ratio of effective to statutory taxation has been significantly lower in the 
                                                 
7 Estrin and Prevezer (2006) describe a situation equivalent to this in the context of Ivanova oblast. 
8 In particular, see Barkhatova (2000) on Russia. 
9 The issue may be of a more general nature. Aidt et al. (2006) speculate that the worldwide surge in public 
spending in middle and high income countries in the 1960s may be associated with improvements in tax-raising 
technology, i.e. enhanced administrative capacities of the government (Ibid., pp. 274-275).   8
CIS than in Central Europe. While this measure is of limited availability, a wider comparison is 
possible using a more general indicator: the ratio of tax revenue to GDP (as also applied in 
Anderson, 2005b). This measure clearly demonstrates the tax implosion in the CIS countries 
during the 1990s (see figure 2d). The EBRD (1998) attributes this situation to the weakness of 
tax administration and corruption, which led to low levels of enforceability. Similarly, Lopez-
Claros and Alexashenko (1998) point out that “the complex institutional set-up underlying the 
operations of the modern tax system, including modern accounting practices, computer 
facilities, and management expertise, simply did not exist when Russia embarked on reform” 
(ibid., p.8)
10. The CIS countries are typically those that endured communist regimes for the 
longest period of time and therefore are also those with the least developed fiscal capacity. It is 
possible that widespread tax avoidance was further fuelled by a legitimacy deficit in these 
largely oligarchic states. If so, the combination of an oligarchic state with an inefficient fiscal 
administration forms a vicious circle along the lines of that detected by Hellman and Kaufmann 
(2003). Congruous with the Acemoglu (2006) model, the vicious circle retards the development 
of fiscal capacity and therefore promotes the erection of entry barriers, so embedding the 
oligarchic state. Indeed, as documented by Johnson et al. (2000) and others, new private 
businesses faced more serious institutional obstacles in the CIS than in CEE. 
 
In sum, in the 1990s, the CIS countries were confronted by a collapse of public revenue (and 
therefore expenditure) as the tax system appropriate for the new market environment proved 
difficult to implement. Soft budgeting of industrial enterprises through continued state control 
of energy prices, cheap credit and tax payment arrears substituted for formal income 
redistribution through the state budget and entry barriers facing new firms remained firmly 
rooted. It is well documented that the ensuing policy establishment, blighted by the leverage of 
special interests, was unable (or unwilling) to efficiently target those in need of redistribution. 
Indeed, though the subsidisation of industry was frequently justified by appeal to social 
concerns, in practice it often amounted to the protection of privileged industrial interests. The 
association of the CIS countries with generally higher inequality lends weight to this 
interpretation.  
 
                                                 
10 The ratio of taxes to GDP decreased in all transition economies temporarily following liberalisation and the 
initial fall in output (see Mickiewicz, 2005). However, these effects should be distinguished from the longer-term 
cross-country variation which refers to the institutional capacities of the fiscal system as discussed here.   9
Motivated by this literature, we turn next to the complicated endeavour of realising some of the 
theoretical insights empirically. Specifically, drawing on Acemoglu (2006) for (i) and (ii) and 
Aghion and Commander (1999) for (iii) we formulate the following testable hypotheses:  
 
i/ Liberalisation is associated with lower equilibrium levels of income inequality. 
ii/ Under authoritarian regimes, there is an important distinction to be drawn between fiscally 
efficient and inefficient regimes. We expect to observe higher levels of inequality in regimes 
with inferior fiscal capacity. 
iii/ While the short term impact of liberalisation tends to be associated with a surge in 
inequality, in the longer term, economies which were able to successfully liberalise and 
stabilise early in the transition process should experience less inequality, an effect parallel to 
that of political freedom. 
 
3. Data and empirical approach 
 
3.1. Measuring Inequality 
 
An outcome of any particular estimation is likely to be misleading if it is based on low quality 
data. This trivial, if often neglected, conclusion is particularly true for inequality data. Atkinson 
and Brandolini (2001) survey the cross-country empirical literature on income inequality and 
cogently forward a number of problem areas. At the heart of these concerns is the issue of 
measurement. The majority of inequality studies centre on income, but inequality can also be 
measured in terms of consumption, wealth, health or any other sensible proxy for well-being. 
Once collected, the data may refer to net or gross figures, it may be measured at the unit of the 
household or of the individual, it may be equivalised to account for the heterogeneity of 
household structure and it may be representative of different populations or sub-populations. In 
this context, without due care being taken in selection, cross-country differences may easily be 
reflecting artefacts of measurement technique as much as actual differences in the distribution. 
Atkinson and Brandolini demonstrate the kind of bias that can arise, not least when 
measurement methods are clearly correlated with country characteristics, as is the case for 
example with consumption-based measures, which are more typical for poor developing 
countries. 
   10
In this study we constructed our inequality dataset in the following way. All data are drawn 
from the June 2005 version of the World Income Inequality Database (WIID2a)
 produced by 
the World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), at the United Nations 
University
11. This dataset incorporates data obtained by the World Bank, UNICEF, OECD, and 
various individual research teams, in each case providing information on the origin of the data 
point, the coverage and the methodology employed. The WIDER dataset compiles all 
alternative assessments for given time-country data points. Not only do these sometimes differ 
considerably but, given the different methodologies utilised in their creation, are sometimes 
also incompatible and so the approach to constructing a dataset for analysis is far from trivial. 
With this in mind, we extracted what we believe to be a consistent set of inequality data, 
according to the following algorithm. 
 
First, we retained income-based data and eliminated all data based on consumption measures
12 
as well as all data points not based on representative coverage of the whole population
13. Where 
possible we have preferred data emanating from studies based on the Canberra group definition 
(see WIDER 2005) where income includes production, barter and other non-cash income. The 
income in question is disposable income, not gross income (therefore, incorporating the impact 
of redistributive policies of the government). The preferred methodology identifies households 
as the appropriate sampling units, corrected with appropriate equivalence scales. Where two 
results based on similar methodology were available, we have taken the source that was (i) 
more recent, and (ii) covered a longer time series. As a supplementary criterion, we also used 
the quality ranking of studies, available from the WIDER database, which to large degree 
confirms the criteria enumerated above. Last but not least, the coefficients retained for analysis 
are, where applicable, those recalculated by WIDER, rather than those originally reported
14.  
 
                                                 
11 Accessed online in January 2006 and used in concert with the user guide produced by WIDER (2005). 
12 There are two reasons for doing this. First, the consumption based measures lead to problems of interpretation 
when used to assess short/medium-term effects (as in this paper). This is because consumption smoothing over 
time distorts the short-term impact of different economic policies and it is not clear how to value the use of 
durables in the consumption set. Second, more practically, the comparable consumption-based inequality data-set 
for transition economies is much smaller, making application of any formal tests very difficult. An example of 
robust consumption-based inequality data for transition economies is presented in Mitra and Yemtsov (2006). 
Preliminary investigations suggest that the (positive) gap between income and consumption measures of inequality 
are greater in less developed transition countries, where consumption data may overstate economic wellbeing at the 
lower end of the distribution. 
13 Our only exceptions to this second criterion were to retain some estimates for the Communist period based on 
wage earner only households. We justify this on the basis that comparisons clearly indicate that – given the 
dominance of this category of income – the results were not sensitive to such a restriction. Moreover, we retained 
only the cases where such comparisons were possible.   11
3.2 Measuring Liberalisation 
 
Empirically capturing the institutional features of any economy is a notoriously tricky problem. 
The most comprehensive set of economic measures available is provided by the EBRD. In the 
most fundamental sense, all reforms might be viewed as ‘institutional’, but in the transition 
frame of reference, there is a particular case for drawing a distinction between the reform 
components that can be introduced relatively quickly via the removal of existing barriers (so 
called ‘liberalisation’) and those that rely on a slower paced (re-) building of legal and 
administrative capacities. The EBRD indicators draw just such a contrast - between 
liberalisation and institutional reform (see EBRD 1995-2005; Balcerowicz, 1995; Mickiewicz, 
2005 among many others). In the ‘liberalisation’ group of reforms, are (i) external 
liberalisation, (ii) internal price liberalisation and (iii) freedom of entry and small-scale 
privatisation
15. The set of ‘institutional reforms’ include large-scale privatisation, competition 
policy, enterprise reform and corporate governance, bank reform and securities markets. 
 
From the perspective of empirical implementation, in our context, there are at least three 
important issues: first, there are serious concerns about measurement error within the EBRD 
indicators; second, the indicators are themselves strongly correlated and; third, there is a close 
connection between indicators of economic liberalisation and political liberalisation.  
 
The first issue has been documented recently by Campos and Horvath (2006), who persuasively 
argue that, not only do the EBRD criteria lack transparency but, more pertinently, the indicators 
of ‘policy inputs’ are mixed with those of ‘policy outputs’
16. The issue of between-indicator 
correlation is equally serious and is amply illustrated, in Table 1, by the correlation coefficients 
between the economic reform indicators and the political freedom indicators. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
14 The full resulting dataset is available on request from the authors. 
15 This approach can be traced back to De Melo et al. (2001 [1997]), who used the aggregate indicator based on 
these three components, labelled as the ‘Cumulative Index of Liberalisation’. 
16 Campos and Horvath (2006) produce their own, methodologically superior and narrower set of measures. 
Unfortunately, the data does not cover all of the period relevant to this study.   12
Table 1  Correlations between economic reform and political freedom indicators 
             |  democra- free     price    trade    large    corpor.   compet.  banking  security 
             |  -cy   entry    liberal.  liberal. privat.  govern.   policy   sector   markets    
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  democracy/ |   1.0000  
     freedom | 
             | 
  free entry |  -0.6207   1.0000  
  & small pri|   0.0000 
             | 
       price |  -0.5793   0.8205   1.0000  
  liberalis. |   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
       trade |  -0.7388   0.8786   0.8457   1.0000  
  liberalis. |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
       large |  -0.6272   0.8536   0.7393   0.8389   1.0000  
  scale priv |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
  corporate  |  -0.7114   0.8385   0.7145   0.8468   0.8766   1.0000  
  governance |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
  competition|  -0.6518   0.7353   0.6165   0.7088   0.8106   0.8248   1.0000  
      policy |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
     banking |  -0.7417   0.8440   0.7279   0.8773   0.8764   0.9310   0.7754   1.0000  
      sector |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
  securities |  -0.6427   0.7323   0.5912   0.7100   0.7942   0.8322   0.8483   0.8142   1.0000  
      markets|   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
 
 
Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients, based on all available data points for 27 transition countries, 1987-2002 
(403 data points); the second line shows significance level. ‘Democracy/freedom’ relates to the average of the 
Freedom House indicators of political rights and civic liberties (see discussion in Section 3.3). The higher value 
of the average of Freedom House indices represents the lower level of democracy. All other variables relate to the 
EBRD indicators of reforms (see discussion in Section 3.1), and are based on EBRD (1995-2005), and Falcetti et al. 
(2002), extended back where possible (full data set available on request).    13
These concerns remind us that we should eschew the temptation to focus on one or other 
particular component of reform when considering the relationship between economic 
development and inequality. Indeed, to estimate these relationships based on such logic would 
fall into the trap of omitted variable bias, as argued powerfully in Acemoglu (2005)
17. 
Likewise, given the inevitable multicollinearity problem, we should also guard against the 
inclusion of the full set of indicators in a single estimation. The standard practice has been to 
use a simple average of the three liberalisation indices referred to as the ‘reform index’ (Falcetti 
et al., 2002; De Melo et al., 2001; Merlevede, 2003). However the insights of Campos and 
Horvath (2006) lead us to eschew such approximations.   
 
In the quest to control distinctly for economic policy, our preferred solution is to focus on 
macroeconomic policy measures (they are not included in the EBRD set of reform indicators). 
Aside from being associated with fewer problems of measurement and reliability, the 
macroeconomic policy variables are less correlated with the democracy-autocracy (oligarchy) 
dimension, which is critical for testing our hypotheses. We include an indicator variable, early 
stabilisation, reflecting the successful implementation of a stabilisation programme by 1993 (as 
in Mickiewicz 2005; see also EBRD, 1999-2005) as well as a time-variant variable measuring 
government budget balance as a percentage of GDP. 
 
With respect to both their centrality to our hypotheses and the clear imbrication of the usual 
economic and political liberalisation measures, we make our primary focus that of political 
institutions. The institutional political indicators have a long empirical tradition. The early 
empirical work tended to rely on comparisons either between ‘distinct’ regional blocks or 
between ‘stable’ and ‘unstable’ democracies (Lipset, 1959). Subsequent authors have used 
empirically realisable concepts such as the percentage participation in national elections. These 
rather crude measures have been widely criticised. Fortunately, we now have more 
sophisticated measures of democracy in our toolbox and are able to examine the complexities of 
the relationships with greater authority. 
 
The measure of democracy we utilise in this paper is based on the well-regarded, subjective 
indicators of political rights and civil liberties deriving from work by Gastil (1990) and 
                                                 
17 The same argument could be applied to earlier non-transition literature that focused on external liberalisation 
indicators, while - typically - the increased internal openness was implemented jointly with other liberalisation and 
privatisation policies.   14
published by Freedom House. Gastil’s separate subjective indices for political rights and civil 
liberties are each recorded on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the ‘most’ democracy and 7 
the ‘least’. We believe these to be particularly appropriate in the transition context. In 
particular, inclusion of civic liberties may be critical and makes the Freedom House measure 
the preferred one in comparison with the Polity IV indicators (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002), 
which focus only on the formal political institutions of democracy.  
 
In our empirical work we utilise measures of political reforms in two ways. First, we follow 
Persson and Tabellini (2003) in taking a simple average of the political rights and civil liberties 
indices as our proxy for democracy. There is sufficient annual variation in our data to render 
this approach meaningful. Second, we look at the more fundamental regime differences 
between the transition countries, as represented by the Freedom House classification between 
free, partly free and non-free regimes. Here, the first of these three categories is our empirical 
proxy of what we have referred to in the literature section as democracy, and the latter two 
categories taken jointly correspond to the concept of oligarchy. The data are presented in Table 
2.   15
Table 2   ‘Free’, ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’ regimes 
 
  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 free91
Albania NF  NF NF NF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF  0 
Armenia  NF NF NF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF  0 
Azerbaijan  NF NF NF PF PF PF NF NF NF NF PF PF PF PF PF PF  0 
Belarus  NF NF NF PF PF PF PF PF PF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF  0 
Bosnia  PF PF PF PF NF NF NF NF NF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF  0 
Bulgaria  NF NF NF PF  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  1 
Croatia  PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF  F  F  F  0 
Czech  Rep.  NF NF NF  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  1 
Estonia  NF NF NF PF  F  PF  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  1 
FYR  Macedonia  PF PF PF PF NF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF  0 
Georgia  NF NF NF PF NF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF  0 
Hungary  PF PF PF  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  1 
Kazakhstan  NF NF NF PF PF PF PF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF  0 
Kyrgyz  Rep.  NF NF NF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF NF NF NF  0 
Latvia  NF NF NF PF  F  PF PF  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  1 
Lithuania  NF NF NF PF  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  1 
Moldova  NF NF NF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF  0 
Poland  PF PF PF  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  1 
Romania  NF NF NF NF PF PF PF PF PF  F F F F F F F 0 
Russia  NF NF NF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF  0 
Serbia  PF PF PF PF NF PF NF NF NF NF NF NF PF PF PF  F  0 
Slovak  Rep.  NF NF NF  F  F  F  PF  F  F  PF PF  F  F  F  F  F  1 
Slovenia  PF PF PF PF  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  1 
Tajikistan  NF NF NF PF PF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF  0 
Turkmenistan  NF NF NF PF PF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF  0 
Ukraine  NF NF NF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF  0 
Uzbekistan  NF NF NF PF PF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF  0 
 
Source: Freedom House, last column: authors’ definition, see discussion in section 3.2.   16
On inspection, one observes that, where there was a regime switch from the communism to 
democracy, it happened in the early 1990s and broadly speaking, the political regimes have 
remained remarkably stable subsequently. Three exceptions, relating to Latvia, Estonia and 
Slovakia in the early 1990’s, merit discussion
18. In each case the early variation in the Freedom 
House measures reflects initial uncertainty in classification rather than genuine regime 
switches. In the case of the two Baltic States mentioned above, the initial variation in 
classification is likely to relate to controversy over the granting of citizenship to ethnic 
minorities that was subsequently resolved. In the case of Slovakia, the variation refers to the 
period of the populist Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and the perceived threats to democracy 
that his rule invited. With the benefit of hindsight (and the subsequent removal of Meciar via 
democratic elections), these threats can be characterised as more apparent than real. 
Notwithstanding these observations, we construct a time-invariant dummy variable early 
democracy distinguishing between the countries that introduced (and retained) full democracy 
in 1991 and those that did not. We include the three countries discussed above in the first 
category, even if there was some subsequent variation in classification, as discussed. The choice 
of 1991 reflects the fact that, although democracy had emerged by 1989-1990 in several Central 
European countries, 1991 was the first year in which democratic opportunities arose for all 
transition countries, due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
 
Figure 1: Inequality, Growth and Democracy in Transition Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Romania switched to full democracy in late 1990s and Serbia and Montenegro in 2002. 
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Note: Democracy increases as the value of the Freedom House democracy index falls. 
 
 
Before we go on to our specifications it is instructive to review our raw data. The means of the 
key variables, showing a striking increase in inequality, democracy and growth are reproduced 
in Figure 1. While we forgo the opportunity of presenting a detailed presentation of trends in 
individual countries
19, for well-established reasons (see Mickiewicz, 2005), we do pause to 
consider the distinction between CIS and non-CIS countries. As discussed in Section 3.1, the 
division between CIS and other transition countries is strongly correlated with the distinction 
                                                 
19 Such analysis is easily available elsewhere. See Milanovic (1998) for a comparative analysis, Commander et al. (1999) 
on Russia and Keane and Prasad (2006) on Poland. Among more recent contributions, Hölscher (2006) compares the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia, showing that while in the three Central European countries income 
inequality increased up to the level observed in the ‘old’ EU countries, Russia experienced a ‘hollowing out of the 
middle class’. 
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between early liberalisers and late liberalisers, and between early stabilisers and late stabilisers. 
Figures 2 - 4 present the unfolding sub-group means for inequality, growth and democracy 
during transition and, referring to our fiscal capacity hypothesis, additionally include the 
evolution of government revenue as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Figure 2: CIS vs. CEE 
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Note: Democracy increases as the value of the Freedom House democracy index falls. 
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Figure 3: Early Stabilisers versus Non-early Stabilisers 
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Note: Democracy increases as the value of the Freedom House democracy index falls. 
 
 
As expected CIS countries have experienced higher income inequality throughout the 1990’s 
though there is evidence of some convergence in more recent years, in which growth in CIS 
countries has outstripped that in non-CIS countries. Also as anticipated, the democracy 
indicator for non-CIS countries has steadily improved over the whole period while, compared 
with 1995, the democracy indicator has worsened for the CIS countries. As discussed, 
government revenue declined more sharply in CIS countries than in CEE and is only slowly 
increasing. Consistent with these indications, equality, democracy and fiscal capacity have been 
consistently higher in those countries able to implement early macroeconomic stabilisation, 
while economic growth benefited from a relative surge in the early nineties. Of course, these are 
but descriptively suggestive of the heterogeneity in the trends in each of our key indicators and 
of the potential explanations for this. To investigate further we turn to our multivariate, panel 
data analysis. 
  
3.3. Specifications and estimation 
 
Given the necessity, outlined above, for applying a rigorous selection method when extracting 
the inequality data, the dataset that emerges inevitably comes with gaps. As a consequence, the 
application of panel methods based on first differencing and a longer time dimension is not   21
possible. We are left then with simple unobserved effects models as the only feasible alternative 
approach. 
 
In order to properly subject our central hypotheses to empirical examination we supplement our 
core variables with additional important variables associated with inequality. It is well 
documented that human capital is key to economic development (Barro (1997, 2001), among 
others), not least through its capacity to aid technology-absorption. However, human capital is 
likely to be of equal importance for political reform and for inequality. To this end, Aghion, 
Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa (1999) argue that higher levels of human capital, promote improved 
governance and good health, which in turn prompt a greater leaning towards redistribution. We 
therefore add a variable capturing the initial upper secondary education enrolment rate. In the 
expectation that it may alleviate inequality, we also control for (lagged) economic growth, 
while, with the opposite expectation, we include the (lagged) dependency ratio, as a proxy for 
the size of the tax base. A weaker tax base diminishes the opportunity for redistribution. 
Further, since regional inequality would seem to have a decisive impact on country level 
inequality (see esp. Commander et al. 1999), as a crude proxy, we introduce an explanatory 
variable reflecting geographic area. Drawing on our descriptive analysis of democracy and 
inequality in CIS versus CEE countries we finally introduce another time-invariant control, 
years spent under communism, as in Fisher and Sahay (2000). This variable represents our 
attempt to capture, albeit crudely, some proxy for initial institutional conditions. Countries that 
remained under communism longer experienced a far more radical eradication of their existing 
liberal institutions and a destruction of their stock of democratic capital. In particular, this 
reflects the difference between Central Europe and the Baltic States, where communism arrived 
after the Second World War, and the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which 
became Soviet republics in the early 1920s and went through the full cycle of the Stalinist (pre-
1950s) regime. 
 
In all of our estimations we take time variant explanatory variables in lags to alleviate possible 
endogeneity problems and control for common time-specific shocks using annual dummies. 
The first variant (1) applies a GLS estimator assuming the correlation between unobservable 
individual effects and explanatory variables to be zero (i.e. it is a ‘random effects’ model)
20. 
Specifically, (1) incorporates time-invariant dummy variables defined as early stabilisation and   22
early democratisation (see discussion in Sections 3.1 and 3.2) as well as the initial education 
control. As important, to shed light on hypothesis (ii), we include a term interacting lagged 
government revenue with our early democracy indicator. 
 
Correspondingly, our first specification takes the following form: 
 
(Gini)i,t = α1(Democracy)i,t-1  +  α2(Gov_Revenue/GDP)i,t-1  +  α3(GDP_Growth)i,t-1  + 
α4(Gov_Balance)i,t-1  +  α5(Dependency_Ratio)i,t-1  +  α6(Early_stabilisation)i + 
α7(Early_democracy)i + α8(Early_democracy*Gov_Rev/GDP)i,t-1  +   + α9(Initial_Education)i 
+ α10(Area)i + α11(Communism_years)i +  ti + ui,t                             (1) 
 
To account for possible problems of endogeneity through the use of government revenue, we 
instrument both government revenue and the associated interactive term taking the ratio of 
exports to GDP and the infant mortality rate as instruments. Following Wooldridge (2002), we 
also add two interactive terms as additional instruments, replacing democracy in the interaction 
between fiscal revenue and our indicator of democracy with the export rate and mortality rate 
correspondingly. The resulting GLS (random effects) three-equation model (2a – 2c) is as 
follows: 
  
(Gini)i,t = α1(Democracy)i,t-1  +  α2(Gov_revenue/GDP)i,t-1  +  α3(GDP_growth)i,t-1  + + 
α4(Gov_Balance)i,t-1  +  α5(Dependency_Ratio)i,t-1 + α6(Early_stabilisation)i + 
α7(Early_democracy)i + α8(Early_democracy*Gov_rev/GDP)i,t-1    +  α9(Initial_education)i +   
α10(Area)i + α11(Communism_years)i +  ti + ui,t                                                                                (2a) 
 
(Gov_revenue/GDP)i,t = β1(Democracy)i,t-1  +  β2(GDP_growth)i,t-1  +  β3(Gov_Balance)i,t-1  +  
β4(Dependency_Ratio)i,t-1 + β5(Early_stabilisation)i + β6(Early_democracy)i + 
β7(Initial_education)i +  β8(Area)i + β9(Communism_years)i + β10(Export_gdp)i,t + 
β11(Export_gdp*Early_democracy)i,t  +  β12(Infant_mortality)i,t + 
β13(Infant_mortality*Early_democracy)i,t  +  ti + ui,t                                                            (2b) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
20 We also estimate this regression in a fixed effects form replacing the time-invariant variables with country fixed 
effects. See next section.   23
(Early_democracy*Gov_rev/GDP)i,t   =   γ1(Democracy)i,t-1  +  γ2(GDP_Growth)i,t-1  + 
γ3(Gov_Balance)i,t-1  +  γ4(Dependency_Ratio)i,t-1 + γ5(Early_stabilisation)i + 
γ6(Early_democracy)i + γ7(Initial_education)i +  γ8(Area)i + γ9(Communism_years)i + 
y10(Export_gdp)i,t + γ11(Export_gdp*Early_democracy)i,t  +  γ12(Infant_mortality)i,t + 
γ13(Infant_mortality*Early_democracy)i,t +  ti  +  ui,t                               (2c) 
 
Finally (model 3), as an alternative method of tackling the potential endogeneity and as another 
test of robustness, we run a specification similar to (1), but instead use the lagged values of 
government revenue and the corresponding interactive term. However, we see the link between 
income inequality and the size of the government as essentially contemporaneous. It is the 
present size of the budget, which affects (net) income inequality via government spending. 
Therefore we see this specification as supplementary only. 
 
In the above equations: 
⎯  Gini refers to the Gini coefficient of income inequality (see discussion in 3.1), 
⎯  Democracy refers to the simple average of the Freedom House political rights and civil 
liberties indices (see discussion in 3.2) 
⎯  Government_revenue ratio to GDP, Government_balance, and GDP_growth, are taken 
from World Bank World Development Indicators 2005 (see definitions therein), 
⎯  Early_democracy assumes the value of one for countries labelled as free in 1991 by 
Freedom House (see discussion in Section 3.2), 
⎯  Early_stabilisation takes the value one for countries that stabilised in 1993 or earlier 
(see discussion in Section 3.2) 
⎯  Communism_years  corresponds to the length of communist period in each country 
(taken from Fisher and Sahay, 2000), 
⎯  Area is the area of each country in square kilometres, 
⎯  Initial_education is the enrolment rate in upper secondary school in 1990, taken from 
the TransMonee database, 
⎯  Infant_mortality rate and Dependency_ratio (the ratio of number of individuals aged 
below 15 or above 64 to the number of individuals aged 15 to 64) are also taken from 
the TransMonee database, 
⎯  Export_GDP: this is an instrument for Gov_revenue (time-variant), defined as the ratio 
of exports to GDP,   24
⎯  c refers to individual country effects,  
⎯  u is an error term, and 
⎯  the i and t subscripts relate to countries and years respectively. 
 
The results of all these specifications are reported in Table 3 and discussed in the following 
section.  
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Table 3. Estimation results 
 
 Model  1a: 
‘random 
effects’ GLS 
Model 1b: 
‘fixed 
effects’ 
Model 2a: 
2stage‘random 
effects’ GLS 
Model 2b: 
2stage‘random 
effects’ GLS 
Model 2c: 
2stage‘random 
effects’ GLS 
Model 3a: 
‘random 
effects’ GLS 
Model 3b: 
‘fixed 
effects’ 
Dependent 
variable 
Gini Gini  Government 
revenue 
Gov. revenue 
x Early Dem 
Gini Gini Gini 
Independent variables: 
Gov. revenue  -.42***(.10)  -.12 (.14)      -.53***(.14)     
Gov. revenue 
lagged 1 year 
         -46***(.09)  -.18(.13) 
Gov. revenue x 
Early democracy 
.24*(.11) .26*(.13)      1.21†  (.71)     
Gov. revenue x 
Early dem.lag 1y 
         .26**(.10)  .30*(.12) 
Democracy lag 1y  -1.27* (.57)  -.42(.63)  .77(.58)  .93*(.43)  -2.07* (.90)  -1.01† (.57)  -30(.61) 
Gov. balance 
lagged 1year 
.13 (.08)  -.05 
(.08) 
.13(.10)  -.13† (.07)  .29† (.16)  .20*(.10)  .01(.09) 
GDP growth 
lagged 1year 
-.10 (.09)  -.07 
(.08) 
.09(.08)  .17** (.06)  -.28† (.16)  -.14(.11)  -.11(.08) 
Dependency ratio 
lagged 1 year 
.44***(.12)  .02 (.16)  .07(.15)  -.16(.11)  .53***(.15)  .42***(.12)  .04(.17)  
Early stabilis.  -.46(1.06)***    .40(1.71)  2.04(1.28)  -8.44***(2.88)  -6.06***(1.05)   
Early democracy  -5.03(3.85)    3.23(4.96)  45.4***(3.71)  -42.03(27.2)  -5.87(3.85)   
Init. education  -.12**(.04)    .12*(.06)  -.02(.04)  -.12*(.06)  -.10*(.04)   
Years under 
Communism 
-.02(.05)   -.31***(.06)  -.07†  (.04)  .03(.07)  -.05(.05)   
Area 8.58***(1.11)   4.27**(1.45)  0.20(1.08)  8.87***(1.61)  8.21(1.07)   
Inf. mortality      -.80***(.15)  .04(.11)       
Inf. mortality 
x Early dem. 
   .36†  (.20)  -.17(.15)       
Export / GDP          .24***(.05)  .05(.04)       
Export / GDP 
x Early dem. 
   -.22***(.06)  -.10*(.04)       
Constant 29.3**(.1)  23.4*(.1)  49.7***(9.3)  15.1*(7.0)  23.2(14.4)  38.5***(9.55)  22.5*(11.1)
R
2 .69  .03      .55  .70  .01 
Wald χ
2  449.18***   392***  5001***  208***  462***   
F statistics    7.33***          6.12*** 
No of obs  176  176  175  175  175  175  175 
No of groups  24  24  24  24  24  24  24   26
Notes to Table 3:   
 
(a) time effects (annual dummies) included in each specification but not reported; 
(b) reported standard errors are robust standard errors; 
(c) *** significant at .001; ** significant at .01; * significant at .05; † significant at .10; 
(d) for Model 1b: gov. revenue & interactive term with democracy jointly significant at .10 level; 
(e) Hausman specification test for Models 1a and 1b: χ
2 (18) = 13.38, insignificant at .10 level; 
(f) Hausman specification test for Models 1a and 2: χ
2 (22) = 2.17, insignificant at .10 level 
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4. Results 
 
For all equations we run multiple Hausman specification tests. In particular, the difference in 
coefficients between random and fixed effects is highly insignificant (models 1a and 1b), given 
that we control for a sufficient number of time invariant variables in the former specification. 
Given the Hausman test results and the likelihood of measurement errors (see the discussion in 
Section 3 above), we see the fixed effects coefficients as of little value. The bias in the latter 
estimator is large in the case of measurement errors (Griliches and Hausman, 1998; Hauk and 
Wacziarg, 2004). 
 
In addition, the Hausman specification test indicates that a less efficient but more consistent 
instrumental variable technique is not necessary
21. Notwithstanding this, we report the latter 
results, noticing that the variation in coefficients is small and keeping in mind that the estimates 
given by Specification 1a represent our preferred ones accordingly. Since our key results are 
robust to the variations in specification and estimation technique, we discuss them here without 
reference to specific coefficients or marginal variations and comment only briefly on the results 
from instrumenting. Instead we concentrate on interpreting the qualitative results in the context 
of our three hypotheses, outlined in Section 2.  
Our first hypothesis concerns the democracy-inequality relationship. For our transition sample, 
we can immediately observe a significant difference in the short-run and longer-run effects of 
liberalisation
22. Firstly, we find evidence that liberalisation is associated with higher short-run 
inequality. Our speculative interpretation of this result is that the transfer to democracy and 
market economy is associated with institutional discontinuities, which result in (temporarily) 
more unequal distributions of income. Another obvious interpretation links our results with the 
literature relating the impact of economic liberalisation on inequality. In the transition context, 
it could be interpreted in line with Aghion and Commander (1999), as summarised in our 
hypothesis (iii). Second however, we garner some evidence demonstrating that countries that 
achieved full democracy early in the transition process and maintained it are characterised by 
                                                 
21 Our instrumental variable model is based on overidentifying restrictions (four instruments for two endogenous 
variables). Correspondingly, we performed another specification test comparing the reported specification with the one 
using two instruments (i.e. only the export to GDP ratio and its interactive term). We could not reject the more efficient 
specification, which uses four instruments. It was the latter, which was next compared with the model without 
instrumenting.  
22 A note on interpretation may prove helpful. For the lagged democracy indicator a negative coefficient implies 
increased inequality, since higher numbers in the Freedom House index refer to lower levels of democracy, while for 
the time invariant democracy indicator, a negative coefficient implies decreased inequality.   28
lower levels of inequality. The ‘early democracy’ variable is marginally insignificant when 
considered alone, but the evidence is stronger when significance of the “early democracy” 
variable is evaluated jointly with its interactive effect. Thus, we claim tentatively some weak 
support for our hypothesis (i): embedding liberal institutions early on results in a more equal 
distribution. 
 
Countries implementing macroeconomic stabilisation programmes successfully by 1993 would 
appear to reap long run social benefits in the form of lower inequality. Persistent inflation 
results in redistribution from the poor to the rich, as the latter are typically better equipped to 
protect their cash balances and hedge their incomes. This is consistent with our hypothesis (iii) 
(highly significant across specifications). On the other hand, the short-run effects of our 
macroeconomic policy variable (government balance) are insignificant. 
 
Last but not least, we consider evidence for hypothesis (ii)). The more intriguing aspect of 
hypothesis (ii) invoked the possible distinction between authoritarian regimes of differing fiscal 
capacity. We immediately observe a strong positive association between the state’s capacity to 
raise revenue and equality
23 across all specifications. However, as the value of the interactive 
term with the democracy dummy demonstrates, there is a significant difference between 
democratic and oligarchic countries in this respect. In particular, the link is strong only for 
oligarchic regimes. Specifically oligarchies better able to raise revenue enjoy lower levels of 
inequality.  
 
Thus, the results are suggestive of two different effects. In democratic regimes, the capacity to 
raise revenue was seen as functionally linked to a greater propensity to redistribute through 
social transfers (Persson and Tabellini, 1994). However, we find only weak evidence supporting 
this effect, apart from the (also weak) direct positive effect of democracy on equality. A much 
stronger effect may be at work in oligarchic regimes. Where oligarchic governments have 
greater control of their fiscal levers, transfers may act to protect the interests of the incumbents 
at a smaller social cost in terms of distribution, than the alternative, which is to use some form 
                                                 
23 Since we consider government expenditure to be constrained by the government’s ability to collect taxes, rather than 
vice versa, we report our specifications with the ratio of revenue to GDP. The results, available on request, using an 
expenditure measure do not qualitatively differ. More generally, it would be better to have a direct measure of the 
quality of the fiscal system. However, such measures are simply not available for our sample. Anderson (2005), who 
focuses of fiscal reforms in transition countries faces the same problem, and analogous to us uses the ratio of tax 
revenue to GDP as a proxy of the quality of the fiscal system in his empirical specifications.   29
of entry barriers. This effect is entirely consistent with our ‘fiscal capacity hypothesis’ (ii) based 
on Acemoglu (2006). 
 
We interpret the results in the light of our earlier discussion of liberalisation in transition 
economies unleashing conflicting forces on the distribution of income. Subsequent to the initial 
thrust given to inequality through the freeing up of wages and the relaxation of regulations 
(Milanovic, 1998), the relevant contrast becomes that of countries based on democracy, as 
opposed to more ‘oligarch’ oriented economic systems. In the latter, barriers to entry protect the 
interests of incumbent economic actors and act as a rein on the economic advancement of those 
in the lower half of the income distribution. As discussed above, this is based on the additional 
qualification concerning the fiscal capacity of the oligarch government. 
 
Turning to our other control variables, consistent with the literature, we find strong evidence 
that transition countries with more comprehensive education systems have been able to achieve 
greater equality in income distribution, while as expected and consistent with Commander  et 
al. (1999),  we find bigger countries to be less equal. Interestingly, the dependency ratio is 
clearly associated with higher inequality suggesting, as one would expect, that a lower tax base 
works against redistribution and the alleviation of inequality. Years spent under the communist 
regime do not affect inequality directly, but as indicated by the instrumental variables 
regression may have another, equally interesting, indirect effect. We turn to this below. 
 
Referring to equation 2a, we find that the lagged share of exports in GDP has a strong positive 
effect on government revenue and that more democratic, better educated societies and larger 
countries per se are also associated with enhanced fiscal capacity. Most interestingly for our 
discussion, the variable, which has the most significant negative impact, is ‘years under 
communism’. Here, our results are entirely consistent with the assessment and interpretation 
presented by EBRD and others, as discussed above. Government revenue collapsed 
dramatically in those transition countries with the most pronounced problems over the 
implementation of efficient tax administration and regulation. Our results indicate that this in 
turn was affected by the inherited level of institutional distortions, as proxied by the time-span 
under communist rule. This is entirely consistent with the recent work of Persson and Tabellini 
(2006) who emphasise the importance of historical experience with democracy and the 
accumulation of a ‘stock of democratic capital’. It is difficult to argue that our findings result 
from a specification error, as the ‘years under communism variable’ appears in the second stage   30
equation as well, where it is highly insignificant. This is interesting, as one would expect the 
link between ‘years under communism’ and inequality to come with a significant negative sign, 
reflecting stronger social preferences towards equality. Thus, the result is consistent with the 
argument that the communist regime has not been necessarily associated with more equality
24. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, informed by the prevailing literature, we revisit the determinants of income 
inequality in the context of the transition and the ongoing process of economic liberalisation. In 
particular, we motivate and investigate three important hypotheses, derived from models 
presented in Acemoglu (2006) and Aghion and Commander (1999), referring to political and 
economic liberalisation and fiscal capacity. 
 
We find evidence that political reform has a direct short-term effect increasing income 
inequality. This however is counter-balanced by a longer-term effect working in the opposite 
direction: the transition countries that achieved stable democracies are characterised by lower 
levels of income inequality. Also, perceived as the crucial part of economic reform, 
macroeconomic stabilisation would appear to be an essential strand of medium term macro 
policy: early successful stabilisations bestowed a positive legacy of greater longer-term 
equality.  
 
To the extent that democratic countries are able to effectively raise revenue, they are better 
equipped to offset inequality through targeted redistribution. Interestingly however, the positive 
link between fiscal capacity and equality is much stronger for oligarchies than for democracies. 
This is the central empirical finding of this paper, which we interpret in line with Acemoglu 
(2006). An oligarchy unable to protect its interests via the fiscal mechanism may resort to 
policies (discouraging entries via legal restrictions and/or weak protection of property rights), 
which are even more distortionary and come with higher social costs. 
 
In the final throes of the command economy system, the communist countries were in crisis, 
output was falling, markets were in disequilibria and support for democratisation and reforms 
                                                 
24 To check the latter hypotesis directly, we run a model for the worldwide sample using the same set of inequality 
indicators and controlling for a standard set of variables. The Communism dummy was insignificant in our 
estimation (results available on request) and this is robust to variation in specification.   31
was widespread and growing. Our results suggest tentatively that those countries most 
effectively embracing democracy were most able to build the required consensus around 
reforms and growth, regardless of their immediate distributional implications. This does not 
imply that the more democratic countries in the region are characterised by higher levels of 
social injustice. Quite the contrary, the democratic system enables the voters to accept the 
reforms, which support growth, at the cost of a short-term negative effect on income 
distribution. Within the democratic framework, they are open to the possibility (or promise) that 
these policies may be outweighed by other compensating policy elements. Our findings 
regarding the longer-term effects of early democratisation may suggest that this promise was 
not disingenuous.   32
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